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ABSTRACT
Data sharing formedical research has been difficult as open-sourcing
clinical data may violate patient privacy. Traditional methods for
face de-identification wipe out facial information entirely, making
it impossible to analyze facial behavior. Recent advancements on
whole-body keypoints detection also rely on facial input to esti-
mate body keypoints. Both facial and body keypoints are critical
in some medical diagnoses, and keypoints invariability after de-
identification is of great importance. Here, we propose a solution
using deepfake technology, the face swapping technique. While
this swapping method has been criticized for invading privacy and
portraiture right, it could conversely protect privacy in medical
video: patients’ faces could be swapped to a proper target face and
become unrecognizable. However, it remained an open question
that to what extent the swapping de-identification method could
affect the automatic detection of body keypoints. In this study,
we apply deepfake technology to Parkinson’s disease examination
videos to de-identify subjects, and quantitatively show that: face-
swapping as a de-identification approach is reliable, and it keeps
the keypoints almost invariant, significantly better than traditional
methods. This study proposes a pipeline for video de-identification
and keypoint preservation, clearing up some ethical restrictions
for medical data sharing. This work could make open-source high
quality medical video datasets more feasible and promote future
medical research that benefits our society.
CCS CONCEPTS
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Figure 1: Images of various de-identification methods.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deepfake technology has drawn a lot of attention recently[24]. It
could swap faces between two persons in videos, and this method
is being used to produce videos for entertainment. Public con-
cerns are growing as deepfake technology may create inappropriate
contents[10] and infringe privacy rights[4]. Its ability to challenge
visual authenticity has a profound impact on our daily life. However,
technologies could often do both evil and good, so as deepfakes.
In this study, we demonstrate that deepfake technology can also
be used to protect privacy in some important (e.g. medical) ap-
plications, working as a better performing face de-identification
method.
Face de-identification has long been a topic in the study of
computer vision[18, 21]. Traditional face de-identification meth-
ods include masking, blurring, and pixelization. Masking means
covering a mask (usually a pure color box) to face region. Blur-
ring and pixelization involve various smoothing or down-sampling
operations to face regions (see Figure 1). The above methods di-
rectly cover face regions, completely eliminating facial data and
any other objects moving around faces. The traditional methods
result in unnatural images and lose all facial information, which
are rather undesirable features. The emerging deepfake technology
provides an all-in-one solution to facial information preservation
and de-identification. Faceswap[5] is a deepfake technology that
takes in faces of two people and trains a deep neural network to
swap their faces. If a subject’s face is swapped to an open-source
face, the generated face becomes unrecognizable to the original
one. Meanwhile, the generated face still keeps original facial infor-
mation, such as expressions and skin color. This approach is robust
to different facial expressions, lighting conditions, and poses. It is
also applicable to videos.
Deepfake technology could be very suitable for some medical ap-
plications. Privacy and ethical issues greatly restrict medical image
and video sharing when human faces are presented. This problem
is very common in neurological diseases such as movement disor-
ders. During video recording for diagnosis, it is often inevitable to
record subjects’ faces. Sometimes the faces of patients are clinical
manifestation of movement disorder[2]. An alternative for sharing
patient movement videos is to extract 3D keypoints and publish the
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keypoints data instead[1, 20]. However, raw videos could provide
far richer information than merely keypoints. In many cases, the
raw videos of patients are way more reliable and valuable than
keypoints extracted by algorithms. Also, state-of-the-art keypoint
detection algorithms are still far from optimal and reliable tracking.
For example, Parkinson’s disease[13] is a nervous system disease
that presents movement disorders, such as bradykinesia on face
and tremor. Parkinson’s disease manifestation is evaluated by the
Unified ParkinsonâĂŹs Disease Rating Scale (UPDRS)[7]. The UP-
DRS examinations are often videotaped for further analysis. For
instance, automated keypoint detection to assess the movement
without markers is an emerging field. Lack of high quality video
dataset hinders the research on movement disorders. As deepfakes
becomes a new option for face de-identification, video data sharing
could be more applicable than before.
Independent of our work, an encoder-decoder network was re-
cently proposed to maximally decorrelate identities of the original
and converted videos for live face de-identification[6]. This work
mainly tries to cheat machine recognition methods, deliberately
produces output images that look similar to the original subject in
human perception, and shows no intention for medical information
preservation. In our case, the face-swapped videos should both be
de-identified by machine algorithms and humans.
However, one thing has been unclear: are keypoints invariant
during face swapping? Since state-of-the-art technologies of RGB
image keypoint detection have full image receptive fields, it is likely
that both detected facial keypoints and body keypoints change after
facial modifications. Presumably, body keypoints detection with
natural faces would be better than body keypoints detection with
unnaturally covered facial areas. Major progress has been made in
keypoint detection task with deep learning methods, for example,
convolutional pose machine[26]. Openpose[3, 25] is a widely used
keypoint detection method that employs the convolutional pose
machine. Research work using Openpose to extract pose keypoints
for applications like medical analysis are emerging[8, 27]. But it’s
known that the methods behave like black boxes and unpredictable
changes in detected keypoints could occur even if a minor change
is applied to the input. In medical applications, fine tracking of
motion is required and it is important to minimize the changes that
face-swapping process brings. Thus, it remained an open question
that to what extent face-swapping could lead to a change in key-
point detection results.
In this work, we apply face-swapping to medical videos for pa-
tient privacy protection and diagnostic human motion information
preservation. We show that deepfake technology is a promising
approach for de-identified invariable keypoint data sharing. We pro-
pose a pipeline to quantify the reliability of face de-identification
and the invariability of keypoints. This approach makes high qual-
ity medical video sharing possible. Since the ethical issues are sub-
stantially alleviated in this way, the computer vision society and
the medical society could better cooperate to conduct research on
movement disorders.
2 METHOD
There are four steps in our proposed pipeline:
(1) We select videos of subject X (a patient) and subject Y (an
open-source character) (original videos).
(2) We train a Faceswap model of subjects X&Y, input original
videos of subject X to the trained model, and convert videos
where the faces are swapped to subject Y.
(3) We create control groups. We cover black masks to face
regions identical to the Faceswap operated face regions
(masked videos). We blur the same face areas to create the
second control group (blurred videos).
(4) We run Openpose on the original, swapped, masked and
blurred videos, and evaluate the keypoint location changes,
taking Openpose result of original videos as ground truth.
2.1 Dataset
We work on videos of patients with Parkinson’s disease, a repre-
sentative movement disorder. The experiment goes on UPDRS test
videos of two subjects. Subject M is a male patient with UPDRS
score 8, and subject F is a female patient with UPDRS score 31.
Each subject’s videos contain a series of tasks from one UPDRS
trial, including talking, tremor, finger tapping, toe tapping, arising
from chair, gait, and comprehensively record subject’s movements.
Subject M has 7176 frames extracted from videos, and subject F has
9282 frames.
As for face-swapping target, we choose open-source videos of
actor 01 (subject A) from the Deep Fake Detection Dataset[22] pro-
vided by Google and JigSaw. A total of 3531 frames of subject A are
selected for face swap model training. As for patients’ training data,
we select item 3.1 (speech) and item 3.2 (facial expression) frames
from different trials to create a high quality training set for subject
F (2320 frames) and subject M (1761 frames).
2.2 Faceswap for Face-Swapping
We choose Faceswap as the face changing tool. For every subject
pairs to swap, a model is trained specifically. Here we use the
original model consisting of a shared encoder and two decoders[9].
The encoder encodes an input face image into a vector, which is a
representation of the face, and the decoder recreates the face from
the representation. Subject X and Y share the same encoder but
each has its own decoder. During training, losses between input
faces and recreated faces are calculated and weights of the encoder
and decoders are updated. After training, an image of subject X
could be swapped to subject Y after encoded by the shared encoder
and recreated by subject Y’s decoder. The whole structure is shown
in Figure 2. We train the original model with batch size 64.
2.3 Traditional De-Identification
We adopt two traditional ways to de-identify subjects: black mask
and blur. The black mask method covers a black rectangle box to
face region. The blur method applies an average filter to face region,
with kernel size half of the face detection bounding box. To assure
manipulations are applied to the same face region, we record the
face detection information of each swapped image from Faceswap
log file and use the same region for masking and blurring.
Figure 2: How Faceswap works. Here X and Y are open-source example subjects. The input face is processed by an encoder and
becomes a representation vector. The vector is processed by a corresponding decoder and becomes a recreated face. During
training, the encoder is shared between 2 subjects while the decoders are separated. Loss for backpropagation is calculated by
the difference between input faces and recreated faces. During swapping, the model switches the decoder to generate swapped
images.
2.4 Openpose for Keypoint Detection
Openpose is a widely used real-time multi-person system to jointly
detect human keypoints developed by CMU Perceptual Comput-
ing Lab. Convolutional pose machine is used in Openpose, which
consists of a sequence of convolutional networks that repeatedly
produce 2D belief maps for the location of each part. At each stage,
image features and the belief maps produced by the previous stage
are used as input, with expanding receptive field. Prediction refines
over stages.
2.5 Face Recognition
We use dlib’s face recognition tool[15] to quantify our face de-
identification result. The dlib model[14] is a ResNet network with
29 convolutional layers, a revised version of the ResNet-34 network
designed for image recognition[11]. It maps a face image to a 128-
dimensional face descriptor. Descriptors of the same person are
near to each other while descriptors from different people are far
apart. By calculating the Euclidean distance of descriptors, it can be
determined whether the input images are of the same person. Set
the distance threshold to 0.6, the dlib model obtains an accuracy of
99.38% on the standard LFW face recognition benchmark[12, 16].
2.6 Keypoint Evaluation
We use keypoint evaluation metrics of Microsoft COCO dataset[17,
23] to quantify keypoints location changes. Object keypoint simi-
larity (OKS) quantifies the similarity between predicted keypoints
and ground truth keypoints:
OKS =
Σi
[
exp
(
− d
2
i
2s2κ2i
δ (vi > 0)
)]
Σi [δ (vi > 0)]
The di ’s are the Euclidean distances (errors) of detected keypoints
and ground truth keypoints; the vi ’s are the visibility indices of
ground truth keypoints (> 0 if annotated); s is the object scale;
κi ’s are per-keypoint constants that control falloff, determined
by human annotator performance analysis. Each keypoint has a
keypoint similarity that ranges between 0 and 1, and by averaging
visible keypoint similarities over an object, we get the OKS. After
setting a threshold of OKS value, the average precision (AP) and
average recall (AR) are determined. In the COCO keypoint detection
challenge, the average of AP at OKS=0.50:0.05:0.95 is the primary
challenge metric.
Figure 3: Images of subject F and M after de-identification
and subject A (the target face).
3 RESULT
In this section, we present the results of employing our pipeline
to UPDRS videos. We validate the reliability to make sure that the
Table 1: Face descriptor average distances and standard deviation. Given threshold 0.6, the original faces are quite different
between subjects (> 0.7); the swapped faces are sufficiently similar to target subject A (< 0.5); the swapped faces are sufficiently
different from their corresponding original subjects (> 0.6).
Intra-subset To original To average original To average subject A
Swapped F 0.190 (0.087) 0.636 (0.033) 0.629 (0.019) 0.466 (0.027)
Swapped M 0.176 (0.062) 0.634 (0.029) 0.631 (0.024) 0.439 (0.029)
Original F 0.181 (0.070) - - 0.756 (0.022)
Original M 0.136 (0.040) - - 0.706 (0.022)
Original A 0.276 (0.050) - - -
Figure 4: T-SNE cluster visualization of face descriptor of
subjects’ original and swapped images. Each point repre-
sents one face image. The points tend to cluster inside face
subsets and segregate from other face subsets. This behavior
implies that face swapping reliably de-identifies subjects.
videos are unrecognizable after swapping. Then we evaluate the
invariability of keypoints to confirm that face-swapping does not
change keypoint information. Finally, we state the irreversibility of
this de-identification method. Figure 3 gives a sample of masked,
blurred, and swapped images of subjects F and M1. Their original
images are not shown for privacy concerns.
During face-swapping, blurry images and images with no face de-
tected are discarded. The output swapped set contains 6601 frames
of subject F and 5129 frames of subject M. Masking and blurring
are applied to the same images. Final image dataset contains 9 sub-
sets: the swapped subject F/M, the masked subject F/M, the blurred
subject F/M, and the original subset F/M/A.
We run Faceswap and Openpose on a NVIDIA GTX TITAN X
GPU. The Faceswap training takes 19 hours for the pairing of sub-
ject F and A, and 18 hours for subject M and A. The face-swapping
1Demo videos:
https://youtu.be/NZ2RbQxAq_w
https://youtu.be/1Lfok_vzEXM
Figure 5: The ROC curve of swapped images. The curve
shows that the swapped face is highly likely to be deter-
mined as target subjectA,with little chance to bemistakenly
determined as the original subject.
of videos takes 120 minutes in total. Openpose keypoint detection
takes 40 minutes in total.
Table 2: Performance onkeypoint invariability. Swapped im-
ages show the highestAP andARat anyOKS threshold. Note
that at extra highOKS threshold 0.95, AP andARof swapped
images are still close to 1.
Swapped Masked Blurred
AP0.5:0.95 0.993 0.933 0.916
AP0.5 1.000 1.000 1.000
AP0.75 0.990 0.990 0.990
AP0.95 0.990 0.443 0.408
AR0.5:0.95 1.000 0.960 0.948
AR0.5 1.000 1.000 1.000
AR0.75 1.000 1.000 0.998
AR0.95 0.998 0.654 0.606
Figure 6: Sample keypoint detection result of an image from
subject F during toe tapping task. Note that the original im-
age’s face is blurred after keypoint detection for privacy con-
cerns.
Figure 7: ImageOKS distribution. The swappingmethod out-
performs the other 2 methods. The main difference is at
high OKS (>0.85) threshold.
3.1 Reliability of Face De-Identification
The swapped faces not only are intuitively distinct from original
faces, but also meet the criteria that the Euclidean distances be-
tween face descriptors are greater than threshold 0.6. Hence, the
reliability of de-identification is verified.
From Figure 3, intuitively the swapped faces are similar to the
target. Figure 4 gives the t-SNE[19] result running on the dlib face
descriptors of the swapped and original image subsets. The plot
clearly shows that points (each point represents a face image) are
close to each other if they come from the same subset. This cluster
feature implies that the dlib face descriptor is able to distinguish
face data here. In the figure, face subsets seem to have boundaries
to separate them. And it further validates that the dlib method is
applicable and implies that the face-swapping method de-identifies
subjects. Notice that subject A’s faces are far from subject F and
M’s original faces, while swapped faces are in the middle of origi-
nal faces. This interesting distribution implies that face-swapping
keeps some of the original features and generates new faces fitting
to the original images.
Table 1 gives a quantified de-identification result that further con-
firms the reliability. The table lists the average Euclidean distances
with standard deviation followed in parentheses. The Intra-subset
column calculates the distances to the subset’s average descriptor.
The To original column calculates the distances between swapped
and original descriptors. The To average original calculates the
distances between swapped descriptors and the corresponding av-
erage original descriptor. The To average subject A calculates the
distances between swapped descriptors and the average original
descriptor of subject A. It is verified that the dlib face descriptors
distinguish different people well in this work. All the subsets have
a low intra-subset distance (≪ 0.6), while the average distance
between original patients and subject A reaches the threshold 0.6.
The face de-identification is successful, because both the To original
and the To average original exceeds the threshold 0.6. Moreover,
the generated faces are actually subject A, because their To average
subject A values are below the threshold 0.6.
The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (Figure 5)
gives a straight forward visualization, showing that the recreated
faces are always to be identified as subject A under different thresh-
old values. We define the true acceptance as the swapped image
being sufficiently close to average subject A, and define the false
acceptance as the swapped image being sufficiently close to average
original subjects. From the curve we could see that nearly 100%
true acceptance rate is reached with a false acceptance rate close
to 0. The area under curve is greater than 0.9999. The ROC curve
shows that the swapped faces are always recognized as subject A
and seldom recognized as the original subjects.
3.2 Invariability of Keypoint Detection
As mentioned above, de-identification methods should avoid chang-
ing keypoint detection outcomes. Our evaluation results show that
Faceswap does the best job of keeping keypoints unchanged, and it
successfully passes high precision keypoint detection tests. Figure
6 displays images rendered with detected keypoints.
Keypoints being totally invariant means that keypoint loca-
tions are identical. Smaller the change, better the de-identification
method. In this case, our modifications are based on original im-
ages, so change calculation should be taken out between modified
images and corresponding original images. We choose the COCO
evaluation as our metric. The invariability determined by COCO
evaluation shall be similar to other metrics. Here, we set Openpose
keypoint detection of original images as ground truth, and compare
the swapped, the masked, and the blurred results. The evaluation re-
sults are shown in table 2. We could see that the swapped AP0.5:0.95
(0.993) is significantly higher than masked AP0.5:0.95 (0.933) and
blurred AP0.5:0.95 (0.916). The swapped AP at OKS threshold 0.95
(AP0.95) remains 0.990, while the masked and blurred AP0.95 drops
drastically blow 0.45. Figure 7 shows the distribution of image OKS.
The result shows that the swapped images’ keypoint information
Figure 8: Single keypoint similarity distributions. It can be seen that body keypoints consistently show high keypoint similar-
ities (>0.95, omitting few outliers), but head keypoints (nose, eyes and ears) behave differently between swapped output and
traditional output. Masked and blurred data’s head keypoints have dispersed distribution, and swapped data’s head keypoints
have concentrated high keypoint similarity distribution.
is kept invariant while traditional methods change the keypoint
information.
To further investigate the exact changes made in different meth-
ods, the distribution of single keypoint similarity is shown in Figure
8. In swapped images, all keypoints are of high similarity, while
in the masked and blurred images, keypoints from head have a
dispersed distribution and consequently lower the overall OKS. The
low head keypoint similarity of traditional methods is understand-
able: the face region is completely covered with black box or large
kernel blur, so detection of head keypionts is more like a random
guess. The face-swapping method recreates eyes, nose and ears and
consequently leads to nearly unchanged keypoints. Body keypoints
are less influenced by different methods. For body keypoints, the
face-swapping method shows no significant improvements on key-
point invariability. The possible explanation of the body keypoint
stability comes from Openpose’s bottom-up feature. Openpose uses
convolutional pose machine to predict keypoints, which has re-
ceptive fields of different sizes. Thus, modifications on the head
area are unlikely to substantially change the prediction of body
keypoints. Other keypoint detection tools with top-down feature
might provide different result on body keypoints invariability.
We confirm that compared to traditional methods, face-swapping
does keep more movement information.
3.3 Irreversibility of Face Swap
The starting point of this work is to protect privacy. So it is a
critical issue that whether original face identity could be reversely
reconstructed from public accessible information. If there existed
a way to attack the de-identified videos and recreate the original
faces, privacy would be infringed.
Consider this case: an attacker has a large amount of swapped
videos of one subject and knows the structure of the deepfakemodel,
but the attacker has no information about the subject’s potential
identity. The attacker intends to reconstruct the original face of the
subject. To do that, the attacker must have the exact encoder and
decoder of the subject pair. However, the model is trained locally
by the video owner and not accessible to the attacker. In addition,
it is impossible to learn about weights of a specific model with
merely swapped videos where original faces are absent and only
open-source faces present. Thus, it is hard to reversibly recreate the
original faces as long as the trained model weights are unknown.
In this way, privacy of subject is protected.
4 CONCLUSION
Deepfake technology has the ability to challenge human visual
authenticity. It might create huge ethical and legal problems in
the near future. In this paper, we provide a positive perspective on
deepfake technology: it could help privacy protection and solve
certain ethical concern, instead of being an ethical issue. Applying
this method could promote medical video data sharing and improve
medical research. It could advance human knowledge, for example,
precise markerless movement tracking.
In this work, we propose a pipeline for privacy protection that
keeps original keypoint information. The core idea is to swap the
faces so that the person is de-identified whilst the body keypoints
and even the facial keypoints remain unchanged. We examine the
reliability of privacy protection, the invariability of keypoints and
the irreversibility of face change. The proposed pipeline has been
shown to be effective for keypoint location preserving, robust to
different people and recording conditions, and invulnerable to at-
tacks.
Further improvements are necessary to make this method more
applicable. First, it relies heavily on face detection, and would be
meaningless if face detection misses even one single face. This
happens when the face is not big enough to be recognized by face
detectors but still recognizable to humans, although we can solve it
by manually screening missed frames for high-value medical videos.
Next, in case of multi-person videos, the method might mess up
with different people in the same image and generate monster faces.
This method also performsworse on profiles, which impairs the con-
tinuity of facial information. In addition, hairstyle or clothing might
accidentally release personal information. Further de-identification
attempts on these parts would better protect privacy.
To our best knowledge, this is the first work to show that deep-
fake technology is applicable to keypoint invariant de-identification,
and to demonstrate that face-swapping approach could achieve
privacy-preserving data sharing for high-valuemedical videos/images.
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